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I. INTRODUCTION

The right to bodily integrity is firmly entrenched in the right to
privacy jurisprudence. An individual who has that right violated by
being subjected to an unwanted touching can sue for damages. For
example, an individual who receives medical treatment against her will
can bring an action for battery, even if that treatment provides her a net
benefit.' Yet, the determination of whether our current system provides
either sufficient compensation for the victim of a nonconsensual
physical invasion or a sufficient disincentive to possible tortfeasors to
prevent such invasions is only possible after the potential damages for
such invasions are considered and discussed. Regrettably, the courts
have been relatively unwilling to treat cases involving the provision of
expressly refused, life-extending medical care in line with the existing
jurisprudence in this area, and thus have helped to mute or negate the
very protections that are often trumpeted as so important. Until the
courts take seriously the protections against the provision of unwanted,
life-extending medical care-which are already built into the law-one
can only expect studies to continue indicating that medical personnel
often provide treatment that has been expressly refused by the patient,2
resulting in patients being forced to endure needless suffering at great
cost to themselves and their families.
Part II of this Article discusses medical torts, distinguishing between
battery and negligence, and the damages that are potentially awarded for
each. Part ml discusses claims for wrongful living damages, explaining
how some courts have ignored the existing jurisprudence in order to
prevent victims from recovering the compensation that they would have
received had the long-established jurisprudence been respected. This
Article concludes by suggesting that the existing jurisprudence provides
the framework for just compensation in many wrongful living cases, but
that some modifications may be necessary in certain kinds of cases if
victims are to be awarded the compensation that is their due.
II. TORT IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT
Medical torts may arise as a result of a medical professional's
negligence or a professional's conscious decision to perform an
unauthorized procedure.3 Although the latter procedures are often
I. See lifra Part ll.D.

2.

See Kellen F. Rodriguez, Suing Health Care Providersfor Saving Lives, 20 J.

LEGAL MED. 1, 5 (1999) (discussing study indicating that "[p]hysicians still were treating

patients with high-tech, life-sustaining care despite clear documentation and awareness
of the patient's decision to refuse such treatment").

3. Discussion of strict liability for medical products is beyond the scope of this
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performed with the perceived best interests of the patient in mind,4 the

medical professional nonetheless is subject to more severe punishment
because society places much value on patient autonomy. Imposing
treatment against a patient's will harms that patient regardless of the
treatment's outcome, 6 and the law has traditionally treated such

invasions accordingly.
A.

The Right to Bodily Integrity

Over a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court made clear in Union
Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford' that the right to bodily integrity is of

paramount importance. The Court stated: "No right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all

restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law."8 Yet, if that right indeed is sacred, then one would
expect that the law would impose potentially severe sanctions against
individuals who abridged that right. Justice Cardozo explained in
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital' that "a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault,
for which he is liable in damages."' Thus, one who performs a medical
procedure contrary to the express wishes of the patient risks imposition

of civil liability."
Schloendorff involved an individual who, according to her own
testimony, had consented to a medical examination but had explicitly
Article.
4. Cf. Kathy Seward Northern, ProcreativeTorts: Enhancing the Common-Law
Protectionfor Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 489, 501 (suggesting that
"the doctor may believe that he or she is acting in the patient's best interests"); Gerald B.
Robertson, Ontario'sNew Informed Consent Law: Codification or Radical Change?, 2
HEALTH L.J. 88, 95 (1994) ("[B]attery may be committed even though the perpetrator is
acting in what he or she genuinely believes to be the victim's best interests.").
5. See infranote 8 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
7. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
8. Id. at251.
9. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
10. Id. at 93.
11. See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Managed Care, Assisted Suicide, and Vulnerable
Populations,73 NoTRE DAMEL. REV. 1275, 1288 (1998) ("The common law doctrine of
battery provides a powerful tool to combat these incentives [toward over-treatment].
Essentially, that doctrine teaches that no one may touch a person without her consent,
even a physician who wishes to perform a beneficial medical procedure.").

refused to have an operation performed.'2

Lack of permission

notwithstanding, 3 a tumor had been removed once the patient had been
anesthetized. 4 Justice Cardozo pointed out that surgery without
permission might be permissible "in cases of emergency where the
patient is unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate before
consent can be obtained."'"
That, however, was not the case in
Schloendorff. The point in dispute was not whether emergency
conditions required the surgery without consent, but whether the
permission in fact had been given. 6 If the jury believed the patient
rather than the medical personnel and found that the authorization for the
procedure had not been given, the doctors might be held liable for the
patient's injuries, 7 assuming that those injuries were directly caused by
the surgery. 8

Justice Cardozo noted that one of the especially troubling facets of
12.
notified
13.
14.
15.

See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93 ("She consented to ...an examination, but
Dr. Bartlett, as she says, that there must be no operation.").
Whether she had in fact consented was contested. See id.
See id.
Id.; see also Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626, 628 (D.C. 1943). The Barnett

court stated:
We hold the law to be that in case of emergency a surgeon may lawfully
perform, and it is his duty to perform, such operation as good surgery demands
even when it means extending the operation further than was originally
contemplated; and that for so doing he is neither to be held in damages, or
denied recovery of his fee.
Id. (footnote omitted). In Perry v. Hodgson, 148 S.E. 659, 662 (Ga. 1929), the court
said: "If the operation was performed contrary to the agreement, and injury resulted, then
the surgeon would be liable in damages as for a trespass, as there is no evidence to show
an emergency or necessity for an additional operation ... ." Id. As one scholar has
observed:
Exceptions will be recognized in unusual circumstances where it is
impracticable to obtain the consent of the patient and where there is a serious
threat to the life or health of the patient which must be dealt with immediately,
either by rendering wholly unauthorized medical treatment or by extending the
scope of an authorized operation to remove or overcome an unforeseen
condition.
Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liabilityfor Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41
MINN. L. REv. 381, 392 (1957).
16. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93 (stating that doctors and some of the nurses
claimed that the patient had in fact consented).
17. See id. ("Following the operation, and, according to the testimony of her
witnesses, because of it, gangrene developed in her left arm, some of her fingers had to
be amputated, and her sufferings were intense.").
18. See id. (outlining testimony that surgery caused the harm); see also Zoski v.
Gaines, 260 N.W. 99, 101 (Mich. 1935). Zoski upheld the lower court finding that
the operation was unlawful and the defendants were therefore guilty of an
assault, but that the blindness which developed after the operation could not be
traced back to such operation; that the operation could not be considered as
having either a causal or precipitating relationship to the blindness, and
plaintiff was therefore not entitled to recover any damages for such blindness.
Id.
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Schloendorff was that "the wrong complained of [involved] trespass,
rather than negligence."' 9 Trespass (i.e., in this case, battery) 20 and

negligence are treated differently in the law, both in tort law generally
and medical torts in particular. For example, in a case of negligence,
harm to the patient must be established before the patient will be entitled
to recover damages.2' In a case involving a battery, however, the patient
will be entitled to damages even if no injury beyond the battery itself can
be established.' Furthermore, damages may be awarded even if they are

not reasonably foreseeable if the defendant has committed an intentional
tort,

whereas only damages that are reasonably foreseeable will be

awarded for negligent acts. 4 Thus, because intentional torts are viewed

with more disfavor by the law than are mere negligent acts,2 damages
for the former may be awarded in circumstances in which no damages
would be awarded were the latter merely at issue.
B. Battery Versus Negligence

Courts distinguish between two types of torts that might arise in the
medical context: battery and negligence.
19.
20.

A battery occurs if, for

Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
For a detailed discussion of trespass to land and trespass to persons, see infra

notes 141-66 and accompanying text.
21. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841, 847 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992) ("In contrast to battery, however, if the court finds negligence, but no
compensable harm, it should not allow nominal damages.") (citations omitted); Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1979) ("[Imf the physician obtains a patient's consent
but has breached his duty to inform, the patient has a cause of action sounding in
negligence for failure to inform the patient of his options, regardless of the due care
exercised at treatment, assuming there is injury.") (emphasis added).

22. See McCoid, supra note 15, at 383-84 ("In a battery action there is no need to

show any actual physical injury, the mere invasion of the plaintiffs right to be free from

unwarranted touching being sufficient to establish damages.").
23. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text.
24. See Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 371 (R.I. 1998) ("[V]ictims of a
negligent tortfeasor are ordinarily permitted to recover for all the injuries and damages
that can be proven to have been reasonably foreseeable and proximately caused by the
tortfeasor's negligence.") (citations omitted).
25. Cf. Sligh v. First Nat'l Bank, 704 So. 2d 1020, 1028 (Miss. 1997). The court
stated:
Our tort doctrine has evolved into two types of torts, ordinary torts and
intentional torts. Public policy deems it so important to deter the commission
of intentional torts or acts of gross negligence, that we allow victims of gross
negligence or intentional torts to recover damages above and beyond what is
necessary to compensate them for their injuries, i.e., punitive damages.
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example, a doctor performs an operation without consent.2 6 However, if

a doctor performs an operation with the patient's consent, but neglected
to mention all of the possible side effects, the doctor may be held to have
been negligent.27 In the latter situation, "[1N]o intentional deviation from

the consent given appears; rather, the doctor in obtaining consent may
have failed to meet his due care duty to disclose pertinent
''
information.... [Thus] the action should be pleaded in negligence."
Where a physician performs an authorized procedure, but failed to give
all of the information that a reasonable patient would have wanted in the

circumstances,29 the physician may be liable if that failure was the
26. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972). The court stated that
battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor
performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the
patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor
performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the
consent given is present.
Id.; see Moser v. Stallings, 387 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1986) ("A medical battery claim
is appropriate only in circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the
patient has not consented.") (citing Cowman v. Homaday, 329 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Iowa
1983); Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Iowa 1973)); Baltzell v. Van Buskirk, 752
S.W.2d 902, 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) ("A claim in battery or trespass may lie by reason
of treatment furnished by a physician where an operation is performed without the
patient's consent or where the operation is not the surgical procedure to which the patient
gave his consent.") (citing Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983)); Physicians' and Dentists' Bus. Bureau v. Dray, 111 P.2d 568, 569 (Wash. 1941)
("That an unauthorized operation constitutes an assault and battery[] may be
conceded."); 2 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 17.2, at 353 (2d ed. 1995) ("The
provision of treatment to a patient without valid consent constitutes a battery.").
27. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8 (discussing case of negligence in which "the patient
consents to certain treatment and the doctor performs that treatment but an undisclosed
inherent complication with a low probability occurs"); see also Baltzell, 752 S.W.2d at
906 ("[VW]here the consent to the treatment was given but with insufficient or incomplete
disclosure of risks, the cause of action is in medical malpractice based on negligence of
the physician to meet a recognized standard of care.") (citing Zahorsky v. Griffin,
Dysart, Taylor, Penner and Lay, P.C., 690 S.W.2d 144, 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (citing
Douthitt v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Mo. 1980))).
28. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8; see Baltzell,752 S.W.2d at 906, which stated:
A claim in battery or trespass may lie by reason of treatment furnished by a
physician where an operation is performed without the patient's consent or
where the operation is not the surgical procedure to which the patient gave his
consent. By contrast, where the consent to the treatment was given but with
insufficient or incomplete disclosure of risks, the cause of action is in medical

malpractice based on negligence of the physician to meet a recognized
standard of care.

Id. (citations omitted); see Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1983) ("If the claim
is characterized as a failure to obtain informed consent, the operation may constitute an
act of medical malpractice; if, however, it is viewed as a failure to obtain any consent, it
is better classified as a battery.").
29. See Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (Md. 1977), which stated:
In recent years, however, an ever-expanding number of courts have
declined to apply a professional standard of care in informed consent cases,
employing instead a general or lay standard of reasonableness set by law and
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proximate cause of the patient's injury.3" Basically, the difference
between medical negligence and a medical battery in this context is that3
the failure to obtain consent with full disclosure involves negligence; '
however, "the battery theory remains applicable where a medical
treatment or procedure is completely unauthorized."32 As a Wisconsin
independent of medical custom. These decisions recognize that protection of
the patient's fundamental right of physical self-determination-the very
cornerstone of the informed consent doctrine-mandates that the scope of a
physician's duty to disclose therapeutic risks and alternatives be governed by
the patient's informational needs. Thus, the appropriate test is not what the
physician in the exercise of his medical judgment thinks a patient should know
before acquiescing in a proposed course of treatment; rather, the focus is on
what data the patient requires in order to make an intelligent decision.
Id. (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (1973); Wilkinson v.
Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (R.I. 1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 861 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Wis.
1975)).
30. See Miller, 522 P.2d at 864, which states:
[I]n the event a patient has consented to a proposed treatment or operation, a
failure of the physician or surgeon to fully inform the patient of all of the
material risks present in his medical situation before obtaining such consent is
negligence; and a physician or surgeon is liable for any injury proximately
resulting from the treatment if a reasonably prudent person in the patient's
position would not have consented to the treatment if adequately informed of
all the significant perils.

Id. (footnote omitted).
31. See Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116, 118-19 (Haw. 1970), which stated:

Here, the touching was with consent and was of the same nature and scope as
that to which the consent was given, but involved an undisclosed collateral
hazard. Cases such as this involve the doctrine of informed consent, and are
deemed to sound in negligence, as raising the question of a neglect of duty
required to be observed by a physician in his relationship with his patient.
Id. (citations omitted); see Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (Sup. Ct. 1992)
(describing negligence law as covering the "failure to obtain consent without full
disclosure of all known risks").
32. Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see Nishi, 473
P.2d at 118 ("Battery is an unlawful touching of another person without his consent....
A touching with consent, but of a different nature or scope from that to which consent
was given, is also battery.") (citations omitted); Comfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684,
699 (Minn. 1977) ("An action for battery is appropriate where the treatment consists of a
touching that is of a substantially different nature and character from that to which the
patient consented.") (emphasis omitted); Perna, 457 A.2d at 438 ("If the claim is
characterized as a failure to obtain informed consent, the operation may constitute an act
of medical malpractice; if, however, it is viewed as a failure to obtain any consent, it is
better classified as a battery."); Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 76 (Wis. 1995)
("When a patient fail[s] to authorize treatment or consent[s] to one form of treatment and
the physician perform[s] a substantially different treatment, the patient ha[s] a cause of
action for battery.") (citations omitted); 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, § 17.11, at 382-83
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appellate court explained, "This means that unless the patient consents to
the physician's recommended treatment approach, the physician may not
proceed with that approach even if the physician personally believes the
'
recommended approach to be in the patient's best interests."33
The
physician's decision to impose her own beliefs about the proper course
of treatment on the patient will make her liable for at least nominal
damnages.'
The requirement that the patient's wishes be followed does not only
extend to the decision of whether or not to initiate a course of treatment.
Should an informed, competent patient decide that a particular course of
treatment was too onerous, that patient would have the right to have the
treatment stopped and to choose a different (medically approved) course
of treatment. As one court explained, "A competent patient's right to

select from among medically acceptable treatment alternatives also
encompasses the right to change one's mind about the treatment
approach selected."3 Yet, this does not merely mean that the patient

would, for example, have to choose a different form of aggressive
("Battery is usually the theory that should be used if the physician has totally (rather than
inadequately) failed to provide material information to the patient or has failed to obtain
consent to treatment whether the prior disclosure of information was adequate or not.").
33. Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998);
see Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74, 79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) ("It seems to be wellestablished that if a doctor operates upon a patient without his patient's consent, that he
has committed a battery upon the patient and is liable in damages therefor."); Rosebush
v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Mich. CL App. 1992) ("[l]f a
physician treats or operates on a patient without consent, the physician has committed a
battery and may be required to respond in damages.") (citations omitted).
34. See ACI Chems., Inc. v. Metaplex, Inc., 615 So. 2d 1192, 1202 (Miss. 1993)
("In cases of intentional tort, nominal damages can... be awarded in the absence of
actual injury."); Kennedy v. Parrott, 90 S.E.2d 754, 757 (N.C. 1956) ("On the other
hand, if her cause of action is for damages for personal injuries proximately resulting
from an assault or trespass on her person, as she now asserts, and such operation was
neither expressly nor impliedly authorized, she is entitled at least to nominal damages.");
Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ohio CL App. 1992)
("When, however, the nonconsensual treatment is harmless or beneficial, damages for
the wrongful act are nominal only, not actual.") (citing Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25,
26 (Ohio 1956)); Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah CL App. 1992)
("[P]roof of an unauthorized invasion of the plaintiff's person, even if harmless, entitles
him to at least nominal damages."). Nominal damages are usually for a very small
amount. See, e.g., Zok v. State, 903 P.2d 574, 578-79 (Alaska 1995) ("[N]ominal
damages are usually one cent or one dollar."); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563
N.W.2d 154, 158 (Wis. 1997) (awarding nominal damages of one dollar). Some courts
have suggested that even an award of nominal damages of one thousand dollars is not
excessive. See Ponce de Leon Condominiums v. DiGirolamo, 232 S.E.2d 62, 64 (Ga.
1977) (upholding one thousand dollars nominal damage award). But see Pugliese v.
Town of Northwood Planning Bd., 408 A.2d 113, 118 (N.H. 1979) (suggesting that one
dollar is usually appropriate nominal damage award and that one hundred dollars would
be too great to be a nominal damage award).
35. Schreiber,579 N.W.2d at 735.
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therapy if one therapy was not proving to be as effective as had
originally been hoped. Because "a competent adult patient has the right
to decline any and all forms of medical intervention, including lifesaving
or life-prolonging treatment, '3 6 a competent refusal of further treatment
would mean that the treatment would have to stop. Continuing the
treatment despite an informed, competent request for its cessation would
constitute a battery.31 A fortiori, if a patient is treated notwithstanding

her having initially and repeatedly expressed an informed, competent
desire not to have that treatment, a battery will have been committed."
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma made clear, "If treatment is
completely unauthorized and performed without any consent at all, there
'
has been a battery."39

A physician will not be allowed to escape a charge of battery merely
because the treatment that he chose comported with good medical
practice, if that treatment was contrary to the express wishes of the
patient.'
Further, the physician may be liable for performing a
36. Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d at 635-36.
37. See Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not to
Inform?, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 543, 546 (1997) ("In the medical context, the concept of

autonomy translates into an understanding that the individual has an unfettered right to
choose the course of medical treatment, including the right not to pursue treatment and to
desist from any treatment where such medical protocol has already been initiated.").
38. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[Where] an ordinary
patient [is] suffering from a physical ailment, the hospital authorities... have no right to
impose compulsory medical treatment against the patient's will and indeed.... to do so
would constitute a common law assault and battery."); see also Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[Wlhere a doctor performs treatment in
the absence of an informed consent, there is an actionable battery.").
39. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1979) (citations omitted).
40. See Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Minn. 1981). The court stated:
It is undisputed that, after the biopsy, Mrs. Kinikin refused breast removal, a
mastectomy, in the absence of proof of cancer. Yet what she received was,
substantially, breast removal....
...

Here, while there was evidence that good practice dictated removal of

the fibrocystic diseased tissue, such disease was not then endangering the

plaintiff's life or health. Immediate removal of virtually all breast tissue was

not necessary.
Id. Additionally the court declared,
In this medical malpractice case the jury found the defendant surgeon was not
negligent in the care and treatment of plaintiff, but that the doctor was liable
for battery and negligent nondisclosure of surgical risks. Damages of
$600,000 were awarded.
Id. at 591. The court affirmed the judgment, including that there was a basis for battery
damages in particular. See id. at 594-96.
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medically approved procedure even if her technique met or exceeded
professional standards." As the Supreme Court of Colorado made clear,
"A physician who operates on a patient's body without the patient's
consent, or who performs an operation different from that to which the
patient consented, commits a battery and is liable for damages resulting
therefrom, notwithstanding
4 2 the exercise of reasonable care in performing
the operative procedure.
Consider Tabor v. Scobee,4 3 a case in which a minor's fallopian tubes
were removed when the doctor had only been given permission to

remove her appendix.
The action was in accord with acceptable
medical practice 5 in that the "evidence indicated that removal of the
tubes probably would be necessary soon [and] that their remaining in the
body in their swollen and infected condition was dangerous. 46 Indeed,
"delay in their removal might have proved harmful, even fatal."47
Nonetheless, because "there still was time to give the parent and the
patient the opportunity to weigh the fateful question, ' the physician
was liable for battery damages.49
Where there has been a battery, there will be no need to establish harm
in addition to the battery itself in order to collect damages.50 In Caudle
v. Betts,5 the Supreme Court of Louisiana explained that because the
"element of personal indignity involved always has been given
considerable weight,"5 2 the "[battery] defendant is liable not only for
contacts that do actual physical harm, but also for those relatively trivial

41. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
42. Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 914 (Colo. 1982); see McCoid, supra note
15, at 392. McCoid stated:
The fact that the medical treatment to which there is no consent is not seriously
harmful, or is in fact beneficial to the patient, does not excuse the doctor.
Further, the fact that treatment is conducted in accordance with the dictates of
good surgery or medicine and is done in a skillful and careful manner does not
constitute an excuse.

Id.

43.

254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951).

48.

Id.

44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 475.
See id.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 477.

49. See id.; see also Wells v. Van Nort, 125 N.E. 910, 910-11 (Ohio 1919)
(holding physician subject to battery damages after removing fallopian tubes when the
patient had only consented to the removal of her appendix).
50. See McCoid, supra note 15, at 384 ("In a battery action there is no need to

show any actual physical injury, the mere invasion of the plaintiffs right to be free from
unwarranted touching being sufficient to establish damages.").
51.
52.

1006
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ones which are merely offensive and insulting."53 The harm is not
merely the untoward consequences of such an invasion, but the invasion
itsefT
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pointed out that a
patient might have a cause of action even if that patient had benefited
from the unauthorized treatment at issue. Thus, the unauthorized
"surgery could have been done perfectly, and could even have had a
beneficial effect on the patient, yet a cause of action could still exist; for
it is the very conduct of the unauthorized procedure which constitutes
the tort."55 Since battery involves an intentional tort,56 punitive damages
may sometimes be imposed in the absence of any physical damage."
55
an Illinois appellate court held that
For example, in Grant v. Petroff,
the plaintiff could seek punitive damages for the defendant's allegedly
unauthorized tubal ligation. 9

53. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 9 (5th ed. 1984); Harrigan v. Rosich, 173 So. 2d 880 (La. CL App. 1965)); see Pema v.
Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1983) ("Under a battery theory, proof of an
unauthorized invasion of the plaintiff's person, even if harmless, entitles him to nominal
damages."); Butler v. Molinski, 277 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tenn. 1955) ("While the facts
show that Mrs. Butler derived no benefit from the professional services rendered, it
likewise shows that she received no injury as a result of such services. In these
circumstances there is no basis for a recovery of other than nominal damages.");
Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Common law battery
does not require that the nonconsensual contact be injurious. Rather, proof of an
unauthorized invasion of the plaintiff s person, even if harmless, entitles him to at least
nominal damages.").
54. See Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943) ("The law is well settled
that an operation cannot be performed without the patient's consent and that one
performed without consent, express or implied, is a technical battery or trespass for
which the operator is liable.") (footnote omitted); Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74, 82-83

(Ariz. 1965) ("If the consent given to the operation in question was ineffectual, every
phase of this operation, from initial anesthesia to final suture, was a continuing battery

for which recovery should be allowed, even ifthe operation had been successful. The
operation itself, under such circumstance, is the wrong."); see also Bonner v. Moran, 126
F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ("We think there can be no doubt that a surgical
operation is a technical battery, regardless of its results, and is excusable only when there
is express or implied consent by the patient; or, stated somewhat differently, the surgeon
is liable in damages if the operation is unauthorized.").
55. Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2d 1003, 1008 (Pa. 1992).
56. See Perna, 457 A.2d at 438 ("[B]ecause battery connotes an intentional
invasion of another's rights, punitive damages may be assessed in an appropriate case.").
57. See id. at 439 ("A nonconsensual operation remains a battery even if
performed skillfully and to the benefit of the patient.").
58. 684 N.E.2d 1020 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
59. See id. at 1020-21, 1027; see also Cacdac v. West, 705 N.E.2d 506, 510-12
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing plaintiff to seek punitive damages in connection with
neurosurgeon's alleged battery).
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C. CurrentVersus Past Treatment Refusals
Many states have recognized that patients can bring a battery action
for treatment performed without their consent.'
Yet, when one
discusses unauthorized treatment, one might only have in mind a
treatment that the patient is currently refusing or, in addition, one that
the patient previously indicated was unacceptable. If tort law merely

made physicians liable for refusing to abide by a patient's currently
expressed wishes, then anytime that a patient was not able to manifest
her wishes, for example, because she was under general anesthesia, the
physician would be immune from liability for competently performing a
medically appropriate procedure. This would be true even if the patient
had previously expressly stated that she did not want that treatment
performed.6
As Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital2 illustrates, tort law
does not merely protect patients from invasions that they currently
refuse.63 However, even Schloendorff left open the possibility that an
emergency situation would preclude the imposition of liability for
unauthorized treatment.64 Such a position is sensible, since in many
situations the patient who is currently unable to consent to the procedure
would have authorized the emergency treatment if able to do so. The
emergency exception should not be understood, however, to permit
treatment whenever a patient's life is endangered. If there were blanket
immunity for any medical procedure competently performed under
emergency conditions, "a physician could circumvent the express wishes
of a terminal patient by waiting to act until the patient was comatose and
critical."65 Such a policy would effectively eliminate the right to refuse
treatment in many cases, and thus is unacceptable. 66
Yet, not all courts have been sensitive to the possibility that requiring
a contemporaneous refusal could effectively nullify the right to
determine one's own medical treatment. For example, in Werth v.
Taylor,67 a Michigan appellate court suggested that a blood transfusion
60. See Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1052 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)
("[A] patient may recover for battery if his refusal is ignored."); see also Cobbs v. Grant,
502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972); Moser v. Stallings, 387 N.W.2d 599, 601-02 (Iowa 1986);
Baltzell v. Van Buskirk, 752 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Physicians' and
Dentists' Bus. Bureau v. Dray, 111 P.2d 568, 569 (Wash. 1941).
61. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
62. 105 N.E.2d 92 (N.Y. 1914).
63. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
65. Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
66. Cf.id. ("We conclude that a patient has the right to refuse treatment, and that
this refusal may not be overcome by the doctrine of implied consent.").
67. 475 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
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was permissible, despite the fact that the physician who had just
operated on the patient told the anesthesiologist ordering the transfusion
that transfusing the patient would deeply offend her religious beliefs."
The Werth appellate court suggested that because the patient's refusals
were "not contemporaneous or informed," 9 the "record could not be
developed regarding Cindy's refusal which would leave open an issue
upon which reasonable minds could differ,"7 ° implying that it was
irrelevant that the patient's husband could attest to his wife's wishes not
to be transfused 7 1 The appellate court claimed to offer a "narrow"
holding, since it was merely holding that without "contemporaneous

refusal of treatment by a fully informed, competent adult patient, no
action lies for battery. 72 Yet, such a holding might have very broad and
unsettling implications.
The difficulty with the Werth decision was not that it had upheld the
permissibility of a treatment that had contravened the patient's express
(but possibly uninformed) wishes. 3 The Werth trial court had held that
it was not clear that the patient would have refused the transfusion had
she been aware of the life-threatening nature of her condition,74 and the
appellate court might merely be understood to have been deferring to the
trial court's factual determination that it was unclear what the patient
would have wanted in the actual circumstances. The appellate court
explained:
It [was] undisputed that [the patient] was unconscious when the critical decision
regarding the blood transfusion to avoid her death was being made. Her prior
refusals had not been made when her life was hanging in the balance or when it

68. See id. at 427 ("[Dr. Taylor] ordered the transfusion of packed red blood cells,
but before the transfusion was given, Dr. Parsons informed him that Cindy was a
Jehovah's Witness.").
69. Id. at 430.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 429 (noting that the patient had previously signed a "Refusal to
Permit Blood Transfusion" form).
74. See id. The court declared:
Here, the trial court determined that Cindy's refusals were made when she
was contemplating merely routine elective surgery and not when
life-threatening circumstances[] were present[,] and concluded that it could not
be said that she made the decision to refuse a blood transfusion while in a
competent state and while fully aware that death would result from such
refusal.

1009

appeared that death might be a possibility if a transfusion were not given. 75

On this reading, the physician's having implied to the patient that there
was no real possibility of serious harm vitiated the patient's refusal of
treatment.76
The appellate court's holding might at least have been understandable
had it offered a different rationale for its decision, for example, had it
reasoned that the patient should be transfused because the state's interest

in the protection of innocent third parties, namely, the patient's newborn
twins, outweighed her right to self-determination.
While such a
holding would not have been in accord with the majority position-

many states will allow a patient to refuse treatment as long as young

children would not thereby be orphaned 79 -such a ruling would have
enjoyed a more solid foundation than the broad rationale that the
appellate court offered."0
The appellate court's suggestion "that it is the patient's fully informed,
contemporaneous decision which alone is sufficient to override evidence
of medical necessity"" t could, if followed, seriously undermine the
patient's right to bodily autonomy in the medical treatment context. It is

precisely this kind of doctrine that would allow a physician to simply
wait until after the patient had lost consciousness, and then transfuse
without fear that he would be subject to liability for damages, clarity of
the patient's expressed wishes notwithstanding." Given the variety of

circumstances in which an individual could not give a contemporaneous
refusal of treatment, the Werth holding (unless properly limited)83 would
75. Id. at 430.
76. See id. at 429-30.
77. See id. at 427 ("Cindy gave birth to her twins on the evening of May 8,
1986.").
78. See, e.g., In re President and Dirs. of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that a mother was not permitted to refuse
treatment, at least in part, because she had to care for a seven-month-old child).
79. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989) ("[T]he
state's interest in maintaining a home with two parents for the minor children does not
override Mrs. Wons' constitutional rights of privacy and religion."); Norwood Hosp. v.
Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1025 (Mass. 1991) ("[T]he State does not have an interest in
maintaining a two-parent household in the absence of compelling evidence that the child
will be abandoned if he is left under the care of a one-parent household."); see also Mark
Strasser, Assisted Suicide and the Competent Terminally Ill. On Ordinary Treatments
and Extraordinary Policies, 74 OR. L. REv. 539, 555 (1995) [hereinafter Strasser,
Assisted Suicide] ("A parent might not be permitted to refuse treatment if her refusal
would result in orphaning her children, although an individual would likely be allowed to
refuse treatment if her refusal would leave her children with only one parent.").

80.

See Strasser, Assisted Suicide, supra note 79, at 554-55 & nn.81-83.

81. Werth, 475 N.W.2d at 430.
82. See id. at 428 (rejecting plaintiffs' contention that "defendant's decision to
perform that procedure with knowledge of this express refusal resulted in a battery").

83.
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not only severely limit the kinds of situations in which an action for
medical battery would be possible, but also might seriously undermine
the trust between doctor and patient.

D. The RequisiteIntentfor a Battery
In many of the cases involving an alleged battery, the medical

personnel have the best of intentions and motivations. 4 It thus becomes

important to establish the requisite intent for a battery. A requirement
that the defendant intend to harm the plaintiff in order for the unwanted
touching to be actionable as an intentional tort would significantly
narrow the kinds of circumstances in the medical context in which such
an action might be brought. Regrettably, the language commonly used
to describe the necessary intent is open to misinterpretation."
In Moser v. Stallings,86 the Iowa Supreme Court offered the standard
characterization of the required intent for a battery,' suggesting that the
"requisite elements of battery are met by showing the wrongdoer
intended to inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the body of the
App. 1992) ("The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient
generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, the right to refuse medical treatment
and procedures.") (citing Werth, 475 N.W.2d at 428). However, the court also suggested
that the "right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment is not lost because of the
incompetence or the youth of the patient." ld. at 636 (citing In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716,
722 (Ga. 1984)).
84. But see People ex rel. Burke v. Steinberg, 73 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (Magis. Ct.
1947). In that case,
The defendant, allegedly a practical nurse, injected five hundred persons with
[a] syringe containing water while she professed to inject the subjects with
vaccine serum.... She later admitted to the officer that she was using merely
water for inoculating purposes and not any serum whatever. She made the
further statement that she had had no purpose other than wanting to impress
her boy friend with her efficiency as a nurse; they had had some disagreement
and she felt, to use her words, "that she would make a hit with him."
Id.

85.

See Spinosa v. Weinstein, 571 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753 (App. Div. 1991)

("[Plaintiff] concedes that the defendants did not intend to harm her, and thus, even
assuming that her consent was invalid, her claim for assault and battery must fail."). But

see White v. University of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 111 n.3 (Idaho 1990) (rejecting that the
intent to harm is a necessary element of battery); England v. S & M Foods, Inc, 511 So.
2d 1313, 1314 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming judgment notwithstanding defendant's
contention that "no battery was committed because [defendant] did not intend to inflict
bodily harm upon plaintiff').
86. 387 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1986).
87. For a discussion of the Restatement position, see infra notes 92-96 and
accompanying text.
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plaintiff."8 However, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding,89 this
does not mean that the perpetrator must intend to injure the victim. It
will suffice if the perpetrator knows that the contact is unwelcome.
Thus, many jurisdictions define the requisite intent for a battery in terms

of whether there was an intent to make an unauthorized bodily contact
rather than an intent to bring about injury.9
The Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") suggests

that an actor will be liable for battery if: (1) "he acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third
person,"92 and (2) a harmful contact results.93 However, the comments to
the Restatement (Second) make clear that "it is immaterial that the actor

is not inspired by any personal hostility to the other, or a desire to injure

88. Moser, 387 N.W.2d at 601-02 (citing 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES,
JR., THE LAW oFTORTS § 3.3, at 216 (1st ed. 1956)).
See White, 797 P.2d at 111 n.3 (suggesting that this formulation is ambiguous).
See Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1360 (Del. 1995), which stated:
In essence, the tort of battery is the intentional, unpermitted contact upon
the person of another which is harmful or offensive. Lack of consent is thus an
essential element of battery. The intent necessary for battery is the intent to
make contact with the person, not the intent to cause harm.
Id. (citations omitted); see 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, at 354 ("[W]hen a patient (or
surrogate) has put the physician on notice that he does not want a particular treatment,
then the subsequent rendition of that treatment to the patient is offensive, and the doctor
knows with substantial certainty that the treatment will be offensive, because it is
unwanted.").
91. See, e.g., Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d 440, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (suggesting
that a person "who forcibly invades the person of another is liable for a battery
regardless of an intent to inflict injury; the only intent which is necessary is that of doing
the particular act in question"); Frey v. Kouf, 484 N.W.2d 864, 868 (S.D. 1992). In
Frey,
The jury was instructed that, to find [defendant] liable, it must find [defendant]
had a specific design to cause the injury to [plaintiff]. That was an incorrect
statement of the law. Instead, the jury should have been instructed that, to find
[defendant] liable, it need only find that [defendant] acted with substantial
certainty that bodily contact with [plaintiff] would occur-that [plaintiff]
would be struck with the glass.
Id. In Garrattv. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955), the court said:
A battery would be established if, in addition to plaintiff's fall, it was
proved that, when [defendant] moved the chair, he knew with substantial
certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had
89.
90.

been.... The mere absence of any intent to injure the plaintiff or to play a
prank on her or to embarrass her, or to commit an assault and battery on her

would not absolve him from liability if in fact he had such knowledge.
Id. (citing Mercer v. Corbin, 20 N.E. 132 (Ind. 1889)); see Soares v. City of Oakland, 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d 405, 407 (Ct. App. 1992) (distinguishing between the intent necessary to
commit a common law tortious battery-intent to do the act-and the intent necessary to
commit a battery for purposes of being able to sue employer rather than have the injuries
covered by Workers' Compensation-the intent must be to cause injury).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 13(a) (1965).
93. See id. § 13(b).
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him."'94 Thus, the individual who plays a practical joke on someone else
will not be immune from liability because he intended no harm.95 The
Restatement (Second) specifically addresses the issue of concern here,
stating that "a surgeon who performs an operation upon a patient who
has refused to submit to it is not relieved from liability by the fact that he
honestly and, indeed, justifiably believes that the operation is necessary

to save the patient's life."96
Not all states follow the above rule that an individual intentionally
touching someone else without permission constitutes a battery. For
example, in Spivey v. Battaglia,97
Respondent... intentionally put his arm around petitioner and pulled her head
toward him. Immediately after this "friendly unsolicited hug," petitioner
suffered a sharp pain in the back of her neck and ear, and sharp pains into the
base of her skull. As a result, petitioner was paralyzed on the left side of her
face and mouth.

98

The question presented before the Spivey court was whether a friendly,
nonconsented-to hug resulting in paralysis should be classified as a
battery.
The Supreme Court of Florida made clear in Spivey that the required
intent "is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do harm. Where
a reasonable man would believe that a particular result was substantially
certainto follow, he will be held in the eyes of the law as though he had
intended it."99 Nonetheless, because it could not "be said that a
reasonable man in this defendant's position would believe that the
certain' to follow,"'' the court
bizarre results herein were 'substantially
101
place.
held that no battery had taken
The Florida court seemed to be reflecting the Restatement (Second)
position. The court correctly suggested that there need be no subjective
desire to harm in order for a battery to take place."° The court also
Yet, the
reflected the Restatement (Second)'s definition of intent."
94. Id. § 13 cmt. c.

95. See id.
96. Id.
258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972).
Id. at 816.
Id. at 816-17.
Id. at817.
See id.
See id. at 816-17; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) position).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 8A (1965) ("The word 'intent' is used
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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court's analysis obviously did not capture the Restatement (Second)
position when suggesting that a battery occurs only where harm was
intended or where a reasonable person would believe that a particular
result was substantially certain to follow. Such an interpretation would
mean that neither an individual playing a practical joke nor a surgeon
performing surgery notwithstanding her patient's express wishes to the
contrary would be liable for a resulting injury, as long as that injury was

neither intended nor substantially certain to result."
On its face, the Spivey ruling is difficult to understand,

5

as it

undermines the principle that "responsibility for harmful consequences
should be carried further in the case of one who does an intentionally
wrongful act than in the case of one who is merely negligent or is not at
fault.""' At the very least, this ruling so severely limits the kinds of acts
that would be included within those classified as "intentionally
wrongful" that the principle simply would not apply in countless cases in
which it would apply in other states. The impetus behind the Spivey
decision becomes clearer, however, when it is understood that the statute
of limitations had run for the potential battery claim in that case. 7 By
holding that this was a case of negligence rather than battery, the Florida
Supreme Court assured that the plaintiff would not be time-barred from
collecting damages."'s Indeed, the court cautioned that its refusing to
classify this act as a battery "does not mean that [the alleged tortfeasor]
does not become liable for such unanticipated results, however. The
settled law is that a defendant becomes liable for reasonably foreseeable
consequences, though the exact results and damages were not
contemplated.""' Thus, because some harm might have been anticipated
from an unsolicited hug, even if the harm that actually occurred might
not be, the court implied that the plaintiff could be treated as an eggshell
skull plaintiff " ° and collect damages. The court's holding that these
throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially
certain to result from it.").
104. But see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (suggesting that both would
be liable according to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) position).
105. See Thomas v. Wyatt, 405 So. 2d 1369, 1370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("[W]e
have some difficulty with the rationale of the Spivey decision ....
").
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 435B cmt. a. (1965).
107. See Spivey, 258 So. 2d at 816; see also McCoid, supra note 15, at 384
(pointing out that "the plaintiff whose case is characterized as one for battery may find
himself subjected to a much shorter period of limitations than is applied to an action for

negligent malpractice").
108. See Spivey, 258 So. 2d at 817 (remanding for jury determination with
appropriate instructions regarding elements of negligence).
109. Id.
110. See Woodhams v. Moore, 840 F. Supp. 517, 519-20 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(discussing "the 'eggshell skull' plaintiff theory"); see also Silva v. Stein, 527 So. 2d
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results were not substantially certain to follow, and thus that the act was
not intentional,"' helped the plaintiff. A byproduct of the decision,
2
however, was that the relevant jurisprudence was thereby muddied.
The Florida court focussed on whether the paralysis was intended,
rather than on whether the unauthorized touching was intended. Most
courts would look at the latter to determine whether a battery had
occurred."' The latter position is more defensible, since the former
position so sharply limits what constitutes a battery that the social
benefits accrued from severely punishing intentional medical torts would
be lost in all but the most extreme cases. Consider Garciav. Psychiatric
Institutes of America, Inc.," 4 a Florida case in which drugs were
administered to a boy while he was under a doctor's care, "directly

contrary

to

[the

plaintiff's]

express

written

directions."" 5

Notwithstanding that there was no testimony that the doctors had
intended to injure the boy or that any harm was substantially certain to
result, this contravention of the mother's expressed wishes was
nonetheless characterized as a battery."6 Had the Garciaappellate court
943, 943-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), where the court stated:
[Floreseeability and proximate cause principles are applicable only in the
determination of the defendant's liability for the initial adverse contact with
the plaintiff. They have no pertinence to the issue of whether, once that
contact has occurred, the defendant is responsible for whatever adverse
consequences the plaintiff suffers-whether they are "foreseeable" or not. It is
the familiar but accurate doctrine that "the tort feasor takes the plaintiff as he
finds him" which is instead controlling.
Id.
111. See Spivey, 258 So. 2d at 816. The plaintiff might have been precluded from
arguing that the behavior at issue was both intentionally tortious and merely negligent,
since the Spivey court seemed to feel that it had to choose between them. See id. ("The
question presented for our determination is whether petitioner's action could be
maintained on the negligence count, or whether respondent's conduct amounted to an
assault and battery as a matter of law .... "); see also Waters v. Blackshear, 591 N.E.2d
184, 185 (Mass. 1992) ("We start with the established principle that intentional conduct
cannot be negligent conduct and that negligent conduct cannot be intentional conduct.")
(citing Sabatinelli v. Butler, 296 N.E.2d 190, 192 (Mass. 1973)); Baltzell v. Van
Buskirk, 752 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) ("A battery is an intentional tort
which, by definition, is not a cause of action for negligence."); c. Thomas v. Wyatt, 405
So. 2d 1369, 1370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("No attack is made upon the negligence
theory, and no objection is raised as to the plaintiff's reliance upon three separate and

possibly inconsistent or duplicitous theories of liability.").
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Thomas, 405 So. 2d at 1370.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
638 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id.

116. See id.
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followed Spivey, it would have held that although the drugs were
intentionally administered without consent, there was neither evidence
of an intent to injure nor evidence that harm was substantially certain to
result, and thus that the action could not constitute a battery. Ironically,
if the Garcia court had applied the Spivey analysis and held that
negligence rather than battery was
at issue, the plaintiff's cause of action
7
would have been time-barred."
In England v. S & M Foods, Inc.,"8 the plaintiff sued for damages for
her humiliation and embarrassment after being hit by a hamburger that
the defendant threw at her." 9 The defendant denied intending to hit her
and denied intending to hurt her.2 When examining whether the results
were "substantially certain to follow,' 2' the court examined whether the
physical contact (the hamburger hitting her) rather than the humiliation
or embarrassment was substantially certain to result. Finding that the
contact was substantially certain (whether or not the emotional harms
were), the court held that a battery had taken place and that intentional
tort damages could be awarded."

In most states, an individual accomplishes a battery when that
individual intentionally commits an unauthorized touching of another,
even if there was no intent to injure and even if the injury was not
substantially certain to result. Indeed, one of the classic examples of a
battery, Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,'13 would not have
been a battery according to the Florida Supreme Court's definition of
that term, even accepting the Schloendorff plaintiffs version of the
facts. 24 The most sensible definition of a battery, at least in the context
of medical torts, will include cases in which the defendant committed an
unauthorized touching, even when the defendant lacked an intent to
injure and even when the injury was not substantially certain to result.
Any other definition would be too destructive to patient autonomy.
E. Damages
Suppose that in fact it can be established that a battery has been
committed. A variety of kinds of damages might at least potentially be
awarded. There might be not only damages for physical harms, but also
117. See id.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

511 So. 2d 1313 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
See id. at 1314.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1315.
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). For a discussion of Schloendorff, see supra notes 9-

124.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

10, 12-14, 18-19 and accompanying text.
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damages for pain and suffering,'" humiliation,' 26 and other harms. The
Oregon Supreme Court suggested that it "is very doubtful that plaintiff
should ever be limited to nominal damages where he has been subjected
to an operation without his consent. ' '
The damages that would be compensable for a battery might include
those that would be difficult to anticipate. For example, in White v.
University of Idaho, 29 the plaintiff was suing for "unexpectedly harmful

injuries,"'3 resulting from a "movement later described as one a pianist

would make in striking and lifting the fingers from a keyboard."'3 1 The
injuries were sufficiently serious that a nerve was scarred and a rib had

to be removed.3 2 The issue before the court was not whether it was
foreseeable that the defendant's contact with the plaintiff would result in
the necessary removal of one of her ribs, but merely whether the

University of Idaho would also be liable for the damages resulting from
the defendant's battery.'33 Because "under Idaho law the intent required
for the commission of a battery is simply the intent to cause an
unpermitted contact not an intent that the contact be harmful or

offensive,"'" 4 and because as a general matter the University would not
be liable for the intentional torts (such as battery) committed by its
employees, the University was held to be immune from liability in this

125. See Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562, 565 (Ill. 1906) ("The law infers pain and
suffering from personal injury.").
126. Cf Glickstein v. Setzer, 78 So. 2d 374, 374-75 (Fla. 1956) (awarding husband
and wife each $5000 damages for battery where the "humiliation and bruised feelings
were perhaps the worst indignities the patient suffered"); Johnson v. Ramsey County,
424 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding plaintiff "suffered emotional
distress and embarrassment as a result of [a] kiss" and awarding $75,000).
127. See Smith v. Hubbard, 91 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Minn. 1958) (awarding plaintiff
$1000 for battery resulting in no physical harm but resulting in kidding and his job
having been made more difficult and unpleasant); Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188,
196 (Utah Ct. App.) ("Damages for pain, suffering, 'psychological problems' and the
like, however, may of course be recovered only to the extent that Lounsbury proves they
were a proximate result of his undergoing the surgery to which he did not consent, rather
than a result of his original injury.").
128. Hively v. Higgs, 253 P. 363, 365 (Or. 1927).
129. 797 P.2d 108 (Idaho 1990).
130. Id. at 109 (quoting White v. University of Idaho, 768 P.2d 827, 828 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1989)).
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 111 (affirming grant of partial summary judgment in favor of

University).
134. Id. at 109.
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case. 3 Given the finding that a battery was involved, the liability of the
tortfeasor seemed to be accepted without discussion.'36
"' the Supreme
In Caudle v. Betts, 37
Court of Louisiana explained that
[t]he defendant's liability for the resulting harm [from a battery] extends, as in
most other cases of intentional torts, to consequences which the defendant did
not intend, and could not reasonably have foreseen, upon the obvious basis that
it is better for unexpected38 losses to fall upon the intentional wrongdoer than
upon the innocent victim.

The Caudle court further explained that the "original purpose of the
courts in providing the action for battery undoubtedly was to keep the

peace by affording a substitute for private retribution."' 39 By making

compensable those damages that were not even reasonably
foreseeable,' 4 it would be less likely that individuals would take it upon
themselves to decide what damages were due and then to collect them.

The Ohio Supreme Court has also suggested that damages for
intentional torts may include harms not reasonably foreseen. In Baker v.
Shynkiv, 4 1 the court had to decide which damages resulting from a

trespass to land were compensable. The Bakers had come home one
evening to discover that a trench had been dug across their driveway so
that water from one neighbor's property could drain through the trench
onto the property of another neighbor.142 Mrs. Baker went to call the

police. 43 Upon returning three minutes later, she found her husband on

the ground.Y He had become quite upset'45 and had suffered some sort
of attack,'46 presumably because he had taken great pride in the
appearance4 of their house and yard. 47 He was pronounced dead later

that night.

1

135. See id. at 108.
136. See id. at 111-12 (Bistline, J., dissenting) (expressing view that classifying the
act at issue as a battery seemed unfair because it would make the state immune from
liability for the acts of its employees in too many cases).
137. 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987).
138. Id.at 392.
139. Id.
at 391 (citing F. SToNE, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, TORT DOCTRINE §
125 (1977)).
140. Cf.Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) ("When a
doctor implements a course of treatment without obtaining the patient's consent, he
breaches his duty and is liable to the patient for any resultant damages.") (emphasis
added) (citing Moser v. Stallings, 387 N.W.2d 599, 601-02 (Iowa 1986)).
141. 451N.E.2d 811 (Ohio 1983).
142. See id.at 812.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.at 815 (Holmes, J., concurring) (discussing the emotional stress that the
husband had suffered).
147. See id.at 812.
148. See id.
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At issue was whether the tortfeasors were only liable for those
Explaining that
damages that were reasonably foreseeable. 9
"[i]ntentional trespassers are within that class of less-favored
wrongdoers,"' 50 the Ohio Supreme Court held that "damages caused by
an intentional trespasser need not be foreseeable to be compensable."' 5'
The court thus was -willing to expand those harms for which an
intentional tortfeasor might be responsible to include those not even
foreseeable, and thus which might not be compensable were this merely
a case of negligence."'
In Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,' 3 the defendant delivered a

mobile home by plowing a path across the plaintiff's snow-covered
field,'m notwithstanding the plaintiff's express refusal to allow the

56
defendant to do so.'55 No damages to the land were established at trial.'
one
and
damages
nominal
in
dollar
The Jacques were awarded one

hundred thousand dollars in punitive damages, awards the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld on appeal.'

7

In Jacque, the Wisconsin court agreed with the plaintiff that "both the
individual and society have significant interests in deterring intentional
trespass to land, regardless of the lack of measurable harm that
results."'58 The court explained,
Society has an interest in preserving the integrity of the legal system.... When
landowners have confidence in the legal system, they are less likely to resort to
"self-help" remedies....
People expect wrongdoers to be appropriately punished. Punitive damages

have the effect of bringing to punishment types of conduct that, though
oppressive and hurtful to the individual, almost invariably go unpunished by the

149.

See id. at 813.

150. Id.
151. Id. at 815.

152. See id.; see also Mary Donovan, Is the Injury Requirement Obsolete in a Claim
for Fear of Future Consequences?, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1337, 1376 (1994) ("[T]he

standard of reasonable foreseeability determines the scope of the plaintiff's recoverable
damages by defining which injuries are the proximate or reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's negligence.").
153. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
154.

See id. at 156.

155.

See id. at 157.

156.
157.

See id. at 156.
See id.; see also Sanchez v. Clayton, 877 P.2d 567, 573 (N.M. 1994) ("In such

158.

Jacque,563 N.W.2d at 159.

cases, the jury may award nominal damages to acknowledge that the cause of action was
established and punitive damages to punish the wrongdoer for violating the rights of the
victim.").
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public prosecutor.159

The Wisconsin Supreme Court worried that any other holding would
send a very bad message to trespassers. "It implicitly tells them that
they are free to go where they please, regardless of the landowner's
wishes. As long as they cause no compensable harm, the only deterrent
intentional trespassers face is the nominal damage award of [one

dollar].'

Yet, the court's reasoning would have applied equally well

had the issue of concern involved a trespass to a person rather than to
land. The societal interest in the integrity of the legal system also must
be promoted when individuals are subjected to nonconsensual invasions.
For example, in cases involving medical batteries, individual victims
(and their families) must be dissuaded from taking the law into their own
hands, especially if prosecutors are unlikely to prosecute. Just as society
does not wish to tell trespassers to land that they can do as they please as
long as they do not cause compensable harm, society does not wish to
send an analogous message to trespassers to persons (i.e., to individuals
who commit battery). This is especially important to consider because
torts involving battery involve harms that may not always be readily
"measurable in money."' 6 ' Society would be sending a very bad
message indeed if it suggested 62that trespass to property was more
offensive than trespass to persons.'
The Supreme Court of New Jersey explained that, in early English
common law, "[tlrespass... was considered quasi-criminal in nature
and was the remedy for forcible, direct, and immediate injuries to
persons or property."'' 63 In part because "[p]eople should not be able
with impunity to trench willfully upon a right,""' the court held that
"punitive damages may be assessed in an action for an intentional tort
involving egregious conduct whether or not compensatory damages are
awarded, at least where some injury, loss, or detriment to the plaintiff
has occurred,"' 65 as, for example, where a battery has occurred.66 Both
trespass to land and trespass to persons are the kinds of torts traditionally
disfavored in the law. If trespass to land is potentially severely
159. Id. at 160-61.
160. Id.
at 161.
161. Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224, 1234 (N.J.
1984) (O'Hem, J., concurring).
162.

Cf. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence

Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 344 (1996) ("Personal property, although not as central as
bodily integrity to persons' capacity to shape their own lives, is nonetheless an essential
social condition for the efficacious pursuit of a conception of the good.").
163. Nappe, 477 A.2d at 1228.
164. Id. at 1231.
165.

166.
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punished, then trespass to persons should be as well.
IU. WRONGFUL LIVING

A wrongful living action involves a claim in tort for damages resulting
from a negligent or intentional interference with one's right to refuse
treatment. 67 The unwanted extension of life resulting from such
unwanted treatment might force one to endure months of pain or,
instead, to "live" in an insensate state for an unlimited period.' 6 The
courts have had some difficulty in determining what damages, if any, are
compensable when an individual who has received unwanted treatment
has thereby had his life extended, even when a clear battery was
involved.
A.

Wrongful Living Versus Wrongful Life

In Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, Inc., 69 the Ohio

Supreme Court wrote that "[fior purposes of a 'wrongful living' cause of
action, the event or loss for which the plaintiff seeks damages is neither
death nor life, but the prolongation of life.'' 70 The court thus

distinguished this action both from a wrongful death action 7' and from a
wrongful life action.'
The Ohio court was correct to distinguish between a "wrongful living"
action and a "wrongful life" action. 7 1 In the latter, a child, who would
167. See John Donohue, Comment, "Wrongful Living": Recoveryfor a Physician's
Infringement on an Individual's Right to Die, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 391,
392 (1998) ("'Wrongful living' is a relatively new cause of action that seeks to redress a
medical professional's intentional or negligent interference with an individual's right to
refuse medical treatment.").
168. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, at 384-90 (discussing these possibilities); see
also S. Elizabeth Wilbom Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism:Resuscitating the
Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1035, 1040 (1998)
("Physicians can sustain life, sometimes for months or even years, for people who are
near death (or horribly diseased), sedated into near oblivion, and connected to dozens of
machines that do most of the individual's 'living."').
169. 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
170. Id. at 227; see A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interferencewith the Right to Die:
The Wrongful Living Cause ofAction, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 638 (1986).
171. Cf Payne v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)
(patient's estate sued doctor for failing to treat without having gotten consent from
arguably competent patient).
172. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
173. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227 ("In a claim for 'wrongful living,' which is
the basis for recovery in this case, the plaintiff does not assert a claim based on a life

1021

not be living but for someone else's fault, sues for damages because, for
example, she must now endure great pain for her entire life. 74 The child

basically is asserting in such an action that it would have been better
never to have
lived at all than to have been forced to live in her
7

condition.

1

Some courts have rejected the wrongful life cause of action, believing

that "[w]hether it is better never to have been born at all than to have
been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be
left to the philosophers and the theologians."'76 However, the courts
have not adopted a similar attitude with respect to individuals choosing
to die rather than living in their current medical conditions,'" perhaps
because the latter decision is probably constitutionally protected.
There are important differences between wrongful life and wrongful
living cases. In the paradigmatic wrongful living case, the victim herself
has expressly refused treatment,'79 perhaps because she knew that she
would die soon and did not wish to spend her last extra days or weeks in
great pain or, perhaps, because she knew that if she received certain
' ° Insofar
treatment, she would live for an indefinite period in great pain.&

as states are reluctant to recognize a wrongful life claim because, in
these claims, victims are unable to make an informed, competent
coming into being.").
174. For a discussion of wrongful life, see generally Mark Strasser, Wrongful Life,
Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable

Jurisdictions Recognize All But One? 64 Mo. L. REV. 29 (1999) [hereinafter Strasser,

Wrongful Life].
175. See Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 294 (Del. 1989);
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
176. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812.
177. A separate question is whether the claims are more analogous than courts seem
willing to accept. See Strasser, Wrongful Life, supra note 174, at 58.
178. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("We have also
assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional
right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.").
179. See William C. Knapp & Fred Hamilton, "Wrongful Living": Resuscitation as
Tortious Interference with a Patient'sRight to Give Informed Refusal, 19 N. KY. L. REV.
253, 258 (1992), where the authors stated:
In contrast to the "wrongful life" concept, the "wrongful living" plaintiff does
not assert a right to make a retrospective decision about whether to be born,
that is, to speculate about what decision the plaintiff would have made had the
future been known to the plaintiff prior to conception or in utero. The
"wrongful living" plaintiff weighs the effects of his medical therapy and his
prognosis with and without the therapy, against the desirability of remaining
alive.
Id. (footnotes omitted)).
180. It is precisely because this situation might occur even when the patient is not
terminally ill that it is not helpful to suggest that in such cases the philosophical question
is whether "the therapy [is] really prolonging life or, in fact, just prolonging death." Id.
at 263.
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decision regarding treatment, the state would not have an analogous
reason to refuse to recognize a wrongful living claim.
The claim here is not that wrongful life actions should not be
recognized. They arguably should be.'8' A few states in fact have
already recognized that cause of action."2 The claim here is merely that
even a state not recognizing wrongful life actions might nonetheless
have good reason to recognize wrongful living actions. 83'
B.

Wrongful Living and Harm

The Anderson court suggested that in a wrongful living claim "the
event or loss for which the plaintiff seeks damages is neither death nor
life, but the prolongationof life."'' Yet, the court was incorrect to imply
that the plaintiff in such an action is solely seeking damages for a
wrongful extension of life. The event for which the plaintiff seeks
damages would be the wrongful imposition of treatment, and that
treatment resulted in a prolongation of life, among other things. The
losses would include the dignitary harm involved in the violation of the
individual's autonomy, as well as the pain and the suffering, the medical
bills, and other items. These separate costs are neither reducible to the
violation of the individual's autonomy, for example, an intentional
interference with the patient's rights,' nor to the prolongation of life
itself. A separate question is whether the prolongation of life was itself a
harm. Even if a court was unwilling to hold that it was a compensable

181. See generally Strasser,Wrongful Life, supra note 174, at29.
182. The supreme courts of California, New Jersey, and Washington have
recognized wrongful life actions. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982);
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 757 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656
P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983).
183. Ironically, in Benoy v. Simons, 831 P.2d 167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), the court
refused to recognize a wrongful prolongation of life action, Harbesonnotwithstanding. See

id. at 170.
184. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227; see Oddi, supra note 170, at 638.
185. See Tricia Jonas Hackleman, Comment, Violation of an Individual'sRight to
Die: The Need for a Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1355, 1370

(1996). In a case involving an intentional interference, damages might include
consequential survival damages for pain and suffering due to the prolongation
of life, dignitary damages based on mental distress suffered for defiling the

patient's express convictions, punitive damages that may be so factually based
as to be left to the judgment of a jury, and extraordinary and unnecessary
medical expenses stemming from the nonconsen[s]ual treatment.
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injury,'86 however, the court should nonetheless be willing to recognize
some of the other, traditionally recognized damages that might result
from a wrongful imposition of treatment, for example, medical expenses
and other extraordinary costs."'
In Anderson, the patient had been resuscitated, notwithstanding an
express order not to do so.18 Nonetheless, it might have been argued
that it was not necessary for the Ohio Supreme Court to address whether

the state would recognize a cause of action for "wrongful living"'89 in
that case, since the patient may have "condoned" the resuscitation when

he later thanked the nurse.'" This condonation might have been used to
support the claim that the treatment was not in fact against his will' 9' or,
perhaps, that the patient (or the administrator of his estate)'92 should have
been estopped from asserting that the treatment constituted a battery.

The claim of condonation or consent at issue here should be
distinguished from what was at issue in Werth v. Taylor.'93 Here, the
claim is not that patients in general should be assumed to desire
resuscitation notwithstanding their previously expressed wishes to the
contrary. The claim is merely that a patient who had left directions not
to be resuscitated might later nonetheless validate or condone the
resuscitation that in fact occurred, previous expressed wishes to the
186. See Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 179, at 266 ("By far the most difficult
element of a 'wrongful living' claim is the concept of continued life as a compensable
injury."); see also Donohue, supra note 167, at 400 ("The real difficulty plaintiffs
encounter in wrongful living suits lies in convincing courts that the prolonging of an
individual's life is an injury meriting damages.").
187. See Donohue, supra note 167, at 413 ("A possible solution to mitigate the
courts' reluctance or inability to award general damages for the violation of the right to
refuse medical treatment would be to allow only special damages for the medical
expenses and extraordinary costs incident to the plaintiff's continued living.") (footnotes
omitted). This would mirror the approach that some courts have taken in wrongful birth
cases. See Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize
a "Wrongid Living" Cause of Action when Doctors Fail to Honor Patients' Advance
Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 149, 225 (1997) ("Such a holding is consistent

with the majority of wrongful birth cases, which allow parents to recover for the
extraordinary medical and other expenses related to raising a child with a disability, but
do not provide compensation for living.").
188. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226.
189. Id. at 227.
190. See id. at 226 ("Upon regaining consciousness, [decedent] expressed his
gratitude to the nurse for saving his life.").
191. After once mentioning that decedent expressed his gratitude, see id., the court
neither explained its legal significance nor even referred to it again.
192. See id. ("Before his death, [decedent] initiated this action against the hospital
for damages resulting from the hospital's failure to obey the 'No Code Blue' order.
After [decedent] died, appellee Keith W. Anderson, administrator of [decedent's] estate,
amended the complaint to substitute himself as plaintiff.").

193. 475 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). For a discussion of Werth, see supra
notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
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contrary notwithstanding. 94
The Anderson court recognized that
in a "wrongful living" action, the plaintiff is asserting a iberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment. It is the denial of this liberty interest,
when the medical professional either negligently or intentionally disregards the
express wishes of a patient, that gives rise to the wrongful living cause of
action. 195

The court thus did not seem to have difficulty in deciding that a harm
would in fact be perpetrated by resuscitating someone against that
person's express wishes. Nonetheless, the court suggested that "[ilt is
the defining of the harm giving rise to damages that is uniquely difficult
in a claim of 'wrongful living."" 96
C.

Causation

When bringing a wrongful living action, the plaintiff must establish
that the tortious act caused the harm. In Anderson, the patient was

defibrillated, but there was no evidence that the defibrillation itself
caused the difficulties subsequently experienced by the plaintiff.'
Because there was no such evidence, the Ohio Supreme Court held that

the defendant could not be held liable for later injuries, notwithstanding
that the patient would suffer a stroke were
the reasonable foreseeability
8
resuscitated.1
he
Presumably, the court refused to allow an award for subsequent

harms, at least in part, out of a fear that it would be too difficult to
articulate a principle that would limit the later damages for which the
tortfeasor might be held responsible." Consider the standard test for

causation in establishing the damages for which a tortfeasor might be
liable.2

As the Anderson court explained, "The standard test for

194. Such a validation would have to be done freely and competently in order to
have legal effect. Cf In re Estate of McNichols v. State, 580 N.E.2d 978, 982 n.8 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1991) (discussing conditions under which the validity of a will might be
contested).
195.

Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.

196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. See id. at 228 ("[The record is devoid of any evidence that the administering
of the resuscitative measures caused the stroke.").
198. See id. ("The record indicates that a stroke was reasonably foreseeable if
[decedent] survived the ventricular tachycardia he suffered on May 28, 1988.").
199.

See id.

200. There are additional limits on the consequences for which the tortfeasor might
be held responsible. See infra notes 203-24 and accompanying text.
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establishing causation is the sine qua non or 'but for' test. Thus, a
defendant's conduct is a cause of the event (or harm) if the event (or
harm) would not have occurred butfor that conduct ....201
The difficulty here is that in a case in which a physician wrongfully
prevents an individual's death, every harm eventually befalling that
individual would not have occurred but for the physician's tortious act.'
Because it might seem unfair to blame the physician for a harm
occurring years later that had nothing to do with the unauthorized
treatment, the standard test for establishing causation might seem
overinclusive.
Yet, this difficulty is more apparent than real, since the definition for
causation is less inclusive than the Anderson court's explanation might
seem to imply.203 While it is true that "once it is established that but for
the conduct of the medical professional, death would have resulted, the
causation element of a 'wrongful living' claim is satisfied," it is not
true that therefore any harms befalling the individual after that time

would therefore be attributed to the tortfeasor.
The Anderson intermediate appellate court explained that "[iun
intentional torts, such as battery, the defendant is liable for all harms that
are proximately caused by the wrongful act." 5 The court explained that
harms are proximately caused if: (1) "they are part of a natural unbroken
sequence resulting from the act," " and (2) they have not been caused by
a "superseding event." ' A latter event may be held to be superseding if
it is not reasonably foreseeable.2"3
The appellate court's discussion reflected a standard way to limit the
consequences for which a tortfeasor may be responsible." The Ohio
Supreme Court had already indicated that reasonable foreseeability does
not expose negligenttortfeasors to limitless liability:
[T]he connection between the defendant's negligence as a proximate cause of
an injury is not broken, if an intervening event is one which might in the natural
201.

Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER &

ed. 1984)).
Cf Daniel Pollack et al., Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital:
Wrongful Livingfrom an American and Jewish Legal Perspective, 45 CLEv. ST. L. REv.
621, 625 (1997) ("The Anderson court ....invoked the specter of 'infinite
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 266 (5th

202.

liability' ..... ".).

203. See id. ("[N]ot all later events will be considered caused by the original act.").
204. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
205. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc. 614 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ohio CL
App. 1992) (citing Allstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Singler, 236 N.E.2d 79, 81 (Ohio 1968)).
206. Id. (citing Strother v. Hutchinson, 423 N.E.2d 467,469 (Ohio 1981)).
207. Id. (citing Cascone v. Herb Kay Co., 451 N.E.2d 815, 819 n.1 (Ohio 1983)).

208. See id.
209.

But see supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on

damages for intentional tortfeasors).
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and ordinary course of things be anticipated as reasonably probable, and the
defendant's negligence remains an important link in the chain of causation? 0

One therefore would expect that the standard applied to intentional
tortfeasors would be no less forgiving.
In Anderson, the Ohio Supreme Court suggested that "the difficult
issue is what damages flow from the 'harm' caused the plaintiff. 21' Yet,
the established jurisprudence makes this "difficult" issue rather easy, at
least in the case before the court. Whether one used the standard
applicable for intentional or negligent torts, 2 the unauthorized treatment
21
was a "but-for" condition of the reasonably foreseeable consequences.
Perhaps it would seem that the patient's having suffered a stroke after
the unauthorized treatment was not really reasonably foreseeable, the
court's admission to the contrary notwithstanding.2 4 Such a claim,
however, is not plausible in light of the consequences that have been
counted as reasonably foreseeable in other contexts. For example, in
State v. Glenn, 5 an individual was attacked by several others.2 6 To
avoid them, he jumped into a lake, where he drowned.2"7 The question at
issue was whether this flight was "reasonably foreseeable."2 8 The court
concluded that it was, 2"9 notwithstanding that the leap into the lake was
arguably a rash, independent act.2
In Blackwell v. American Film Co.,"' a man's leg was broken due to
the negligence of one of the defendant's employees. m The victim died
as a result of a later operation to enable him to walk. Notwithstanding
that the original injury was not life-threatening and that the victim was
expected to live indefinitely after that injury m the defendant was held
210.
211.
212.

Taylor v. Webster, 231 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ohio 1967) (citations omitted).
Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.
See supra notes 200-10 and accompanying text.

213. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228 ("[A] stroke was reasonably foreseeable if
[decedent] survived.").
214.

See id.

215.
216.

526 N.W.2d 752 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
See id. at 753.

217. See id.
218. Id. at 757. Further, in a criminal case, one would expect "reasonably

foreseeable" to be even more narrowly defined than in a civil case.
219. See id. ("When one person batters another, he or she reasonably foresees that
the victim may flee.").
220.

See id.

221.
222.
223.

209 P. 999 (Cal. 1922).
See id. at 1000.
See id. at 1001 (noting evidence that suggested that the decedent would have
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liable for the victim's death. Further, in Blackwell, there was no claim
that the original wrongdoing was intentional.2 If, indeed, the above are
sufficiently foreseeable for the perpetrators to be held legally
responsible, then the harms at issue in Anderson should be thought
sufficiently foreseeable as well.
D. Wrongful Living Damages Versus Battery Damages
In Anderson, the Ohio Supreme Court was deciding at least two
different issues: (1) whether to allow a new cause of action-wrongful

living, and (2) what damages should be allowed for the battery. Yet, the
court at times seemed to conflate the issues, although there was no need
to do so.
Consider the tack taken by the Anderson intermediate appellate court,
which rejected the cause of action for wrongful living,. but nonetheless
remanded the case to determine the possible battery or negligence
damages." 6 On the second round of appeals, the intermediate appellate
court reaffirmed that the state did not recognize a cause of action for
wrongful life, 27 but nonetheless reasoned "that a patient may recover
damages based upon the torts of negligence or battery for all the
foreseeable consequences of the therapy, including the pain, suffering,
and emotional distress beyond that which he normally would have
suffered had the therapy not been initiated." 22
The Ohio Supreme Court criticized the intermediate appellate court's
theory of recovery because it seemed "identical to the theory of recovery
underlying a claim of 'wrongful living."'22'9 Thus, because the patient
would have died had he not received the unauthorized treatment, and
because the harms to the victim were reasonably foreseeable,' 3' the
intermediate court's reasoning would establish that the plaintiff might
be entitled to the very damages to which he might have been entitled had
the tort of wrongful living been recognized.
lived indefinitely had he not undergone the second operation).
224. See id. (stating defendant was merely negligent).
225. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 614 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992).
226. See id. at 847.

227. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL

109128, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995); rev'd 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
228. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228 (emphasis omitted) (discussing second
intermediate appellate opinion).

229. Id.
230. See id. ("The record clearly indicates that [decedent] would have died on May
30, 1988, without the defibrillation and, consequently, would not have suffered any
subsequent medical conditions.").
231. See id.
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Perhaps believing that the intermediate appellate court had recognized
the wrongful living cause of action sub silentio, the Ohio Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "damages, if any, must be based strictly on the

theories of negligence or battery. ' +2 Yet, as the intermediate appellate
court had pointed out, the plaintiff-appellant had "advanced alternative,
nonexclusive legal theories: battery, negligence, and 'wrongful
living. ' 32 3 Even had the wrongful living legal theory never been
advanced, either of the other two theories (battery or negligence) might
have sufficed to support a claim for the damages sought. The
intermediate appellate court was not recognizing a wrongful living claim
sub silentio but, instead, was simply applying standard tort law.
Because Anderson was precisely the kind of case in which a separate tort
for wrongful living was unnecessary, the damages awarded might be
the same whether or not the state recognized a cause of action for
wrongful living.
E. Damages Concept or Separate Cause ofAction?
One of the confusing aspects of the Anderson opinion was that it was
not clear whether the Ohio Supreme Court viewed wrongful living as a
separate cause of action or as something else. The court explained, "In
reality, a claim of wrongful living is a damages concept, just as a claim
for 'wrongful whiplash' or 'wrongful broken arm,' and must necessarily
involve an underlying claim of negligence or battery." 5 The court
232. Id.
233. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 614 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992).

234. Cf 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, § 17.17, at 401 ("The dismissal of this novel

cause of action should work no hardship on the plaintiff in terms of establishing liability
because the alleged facts state a cause of action for battery, negligence, or both.")
235. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. See Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 179, at 261,
which stated:

In addition to the recognition of a cause of action for wrongful living
when an individual's liberty interest in the right to die is thwarted, it is also
necessary for attorneys and judges confronted with a wrongful living case to

understand that "wrongful living" is, in reality, a damages concept. There is
no more a "cause of action" for "wrongful living" than there is a cause of
action for a "wrongful broken leg" or a "wrongful whiplash." In every such
case there must be some underlying tort. Every "wrongful living" case must
involve underlying negligence or battery.
Id.; see Donohue, supra note 167, at 399 ("In actuality, wrongful living is a damages
concept, and like a claim for 'wrongful whiplash' or a 'wrongful broken arm,' it is an
action which necessarily involves an underlying claim of negligence or battery.").
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framed the damage question to be: "Where a medical provider
administers a life-prolonging treatment or procedure to a patient against
the patient's instructions, is the medical provider liable for all
foreseeable consequential damages resulting from the treatment or
procedure? ' '2 6 By framing the question this way, the court seemed to be
characterizing the issue as a fairly standard medical tort. The court thus
seemed to be asking, "Where a medical provider commits a battery, is
that provider liable for all foreseeable consequential damages resulting
from that battery?"
Yet, the court then restated the issue in the following way: "In its

simplest form, the question becomes: Is 'continued living'

a

compensable injury?"2 7 However, in its restatement of the question
before it, the court did not reduce the damages question into its simplest
form, but merely changed it.2 8 Thus, suppose that wrongful living was
never mentioned and that the plaintiff did not seek damages for his life
having been prolonged, but instead sought damages for the unnecessary
pain and suffering, medical expenses, and other losses that he incurred.*9
Those would have been compensable given the way the issue was
originally stated, but would not have been compensable given the way
the question was restated.
The Anderson court refused to include the pain, medical expenses, and
other losses within the causally related harms, having decided that the
"only damages that appellee may recover are those damages suffered by
[decedent] due directly to the battery."' The court stated that "[w]here
the battery was physically harmless, ... the plaintiff is entitled to
nominal damages only," 24' notwithstanding that the medical expenses,
for example, were due directly to the battery both in the "but-for" and in
the "reasonably foreseeable" senses.4 2
236.
237.

Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226.
Id. at 227; see Oddi, supra note 170, at 638. Oddi stated:
If, however, the life of the person asserting the right to die is prolonged
even briefly, the loss is that prolongation. There would be a causal connection
between the interference of defendant and that loss, as the prolongation of life

would not have occurred but for the conduct of defendant.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
238. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 230 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) ("Contrary to the
assertion of the majority opinion, the plaintiff was not seeking to recover because

[decedent's] life was prolonged.").
239. See, e.g., Milani, supra note 187, at 224 n.353 ("The damages resulting from
the battery when a patient has specifically asked not to be resuscitated necessarily
include all future medical expenses: If the patient had not been resuscitated, he would
not be alive to incur these expenses.").
240. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229.

241.

242.
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The patient had been forced to endure physical and emotional pain and

to incur various medical and other financial expenses as a result of the
unwanted treatment" and deserved to be compensated for those
harms.' As a District of Columbia appellate court pointed out, "Once
liability is established for intentional torts such as ...battery, a plaintiff
is entitled at least to nominal damages, as well as to compensation for
'mental suffering .... ,,,24
The point here is not to contest the court's conclusion that the
defibrillation had not caused the decedent's later stroke, since no
evidence had been presented to support such a contention.246 Rather, the
point is that the court used an inappropriately narrow view of which
harms might be attributed to the unwanted treatment. 247 Here, because
the patient suffered no damages as a result of the defibrillation of his
heart, that is, "no tissue bums or broken bones, ' the court concluded
that there were no compensable harms. Yet, such an analysis is not
consistent with the holdings in other cases. In cases involving
negligence, the defendants have been held responsible for foreseeable
harms, even if the direct harm brought about by the defendant-for
example, breaking the plaintiff's leg-did not bring about the harm at
issue, namely, death.249 In cases involving trespass, the defendants have

died without the defibrillation, and

that, therefore, the stroke and other medical
problems would not have occurred "but for" the defibrillation. It even
acknowledged that the occurrence of a stroke might have been reasonably
foreseeable, given [decedent's] medical problems at the time he was

resuscitated.
Id. (citation omitted).
243. See Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 843.
244. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, at 401 ("The Anderson court overturned the grant
of summary judgment on the battery and negligence claims, but upheld the judgment
dismissing the 'wrongful living' claim on the ground that added life, which resulted from
the defendants' actions, 'is not a compensable harm."') (citation omitted).
245. Marshall v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 1374, 1380 (D.C. 1978) (emphasis
added) (quoting Neisner Bros., Inc. v. Ramos, 326 A.2d 239, 240 (D.C. 1974)).
246. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229 ("The record supports our conclusion.
[Plaintiff] never presented any evidence that the defibrillation itself caused or
contributed to [decedent's] suffering a stroke in any way other than by simply
prolonginghis life.").
247. See Pollack et al., supra note 202, at 626 ("By adopting such an unwarranted
and narrow view of causation, the court emasculated the use of a traditional tort concept
of battery to obtain damages from a health care provider who interferes with a patient's
legal right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.").
248. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229.
249. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
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been held liable for harms that were not even reasonably foreseeable."0
The Ohio Supreme Court criticized the intermediate appellate court
because the latter court would have been willing to award the same
damages as would have been awarded had a wrongful living action been
recognized."' Yet, rather than establish that the lower court's analysis
was incorrect, the fact that the same damages would have been awarded
either way suggests that the wrongful living damages concept was
simply doing no work in that case. It would be as if zero damages were
being awarded for the wrongful prolongation of life, which presumably
is exactly what the Ohio Supreme Court thought appropriate.
F. The Value of Life
A different interpretation of the Ohio Supreme Court's Anderson
opinion is that the court was implicitly adopting and applying the
"Benefits Rule" discussed in the Restatement (Second), which reads,
"When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff.., and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest
of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is
equitable. ' 252 The court's comments suggest that it was at least
considering some of the benefits enjoyed as a result of the treatment,
since the court expressly pointed out, "Although [decedent] remained
partially paralyzed until his death in April 1990, he enjoyed numerous
visits and outings with his family. ' n23 If in fact the court wished to have
the benefits and the damages of the wrongful extension balanced against

each other, however, then the court should have remanded the case with
the appropriate instruction for the jury rather than have held that only the
direct harms-for example, tissue bums or broken bones ---were
compensable."5
Yet another interpretation of the Anderson opinion is that the court
was suggesting that it is impossible to assign a dollar value to life
itself-indeed, the court "recognized 'the impossibility of a jury placing
a price tag' on the benefit of life." 6 However, the impossibility of
placing a price tag on the value of life might have two different
meanings, neither of which would provide a helpful explanation of what
250.

See supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text.

251.
252.

See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.

255.

See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
253. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226.
254. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.

256.

Id. at 228 (quoting Johnson v. University Hosps., 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1378

(Ohio 1989)).

1032

[VOL. 36: 997, 1999]

A Jurisprudencein Disarray
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the court in fact decided.
When suggesting that it is impossible to put a price tag on the value of
life, the court might have been suggesting that life is something that is
beyond valuing and literally cannot be priced-one must refuse to
ascribe any particularvalue to it, either positive or negative. A different
way of putting this would be to suggest that the interest in life is
incommensurable, and thus should neither be used to offset nor to
augment damages. However, insofar as the value of life is not even
appropriately considered in the calculation of damages, it would be as if
one would be assigning it a zero value. 7 This is because any other
value would affect the calculation. Yet, this in effect is what the
intermediate appellate court did and what the Ohio Supreme Court
reversed.
The Restatement (Second) suggests that the Benefits Rule should be
understood to mean "that the damages allowable for an interference with
a particular interest be diminished by the amount to which the same
interest has been benefited by the defendant's tortious conduct." ' 8 For
example, in a case involving an unauthorized surgery that is painful but
averts future pain, the benefit (the avoidance of future pain) should be
considered when calculating the damages.2 9 However,
Damages resulting from an invasion of one interest are not diminished by
showing that another interest has been benefited. Thus one who has harmed
another's reputation by defamatory statements cannot show in mitigation of
damages that the other has been financially benefited from their publication...
unless damages are claimed for harm to pecuniary interests .... Damages for
pain and suffering are not diminished by showing that the earning capacity of
the plaintiff has been increased by the defendant's act.

One issue, then, will be whether the prolongation of life should be
regarded as a possible offset for pain thereby caused. However, there
might be counterintuitive implications of such an approach, for example,
that a wrongful death award should be diminished by the worth of the
(net) pain that the tortfeasor thereby prevented the victim from
experiencing. Further, even if life and pain were viewed as potential
offsets, increased life would seem to be a nonpecuniary interest, and thus

257. While this would not be to say that life itself is worthless, it would be to say
that the "value" of life would not be an appropriate item on the relevant ledger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 920 cmt. a (1979).
258.
259.

See id. § 920 cmt. a, illus. 1.

260.

Id. § 920 cmt. b.
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not appropriately offsetting, for example, medical expenses."
One of the confusing aspects of Anderson was that the Ohio Supreme
Court would allow recovery for certain harms-bums or broken bonesbut not others.262 Yet, if the court's point was that life is of such
immense value that everything else pales in comparison, then it does not
seem that damages should be awarded for anything, even for bums or

broken bones.
The court's suggesting that life has this incomparable value may have
other implications which, at the very least, would be quite controversial.

Consider those who object to having a blood transfusion because they

believe that it is "a violation of the law of God,"" 3 and "that ingestion of
whole blood will deny [them] both resurrection and eternal salvation."""
Were one to ask those people how much eternal salvation was worth or,
perhaps, whether life was preferable to eternal salvation, one would
realize that not all believe everything else pales in comparison to the
value of life (in this world). Indeed, some refuse treatment precisely
because they believe doing otherwise will cause them to lose eternal

reward? 5-for example, everlasting life.26
261.

Cf. Maggie J. Randall Robb, Comment, Living Wills: The Right to Refuse Life

Sustaining Medical Treatment-A Right Without a Remedy?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv.
169, 187 (1997). Robb declared:
Health care providers should not receive economic compensation for unwanted
medical services. A patient who is resuscitated against his or her wishes
should be able to recover damages for all future medical expenses, costs of
nursing home care, pain and suffering, and emotional distress related to the
unwanted medical treatment.
Id.; see Willard H. Pedrick, Arizona Tort Law and Dignified Death, 22 Aiz. ST. L.J. 63,

85-86 (1990). Pedrick stated:

Refusing to pay for life-support systems supplied in defiance of the patient's
instructions may be an even more effective sanction to vindicate patient
autonomy. To the extent that the decedent's estate or their family is billed for
medical expenses, they should decline to pay for life-support systems that were
countermanded.
Id. But see Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854-55 (App.
Div. 1992) (requiring family to pay for unwanted treatment of deceased).
262. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
263. In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (M11.
1965); see Werth v. Taylor,
475 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) ("According to Cindy Werth's deposition
testimony, one of the most deeply held of these tenets is the belief that it is a sin to
receive blood transfusions.").
264. St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
265. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 373 (D.C. 1972). The court said:
When the petition was brought to Judge Bacon's home the night of the
accident, the patient's wife, brother, and grandfather were present. They stated
the views of the patient and agreed with them, explaining that those views are
based on strong religious convictions. The grandfather explained that the
patient "wants to live very much.... He wants to live in the Bible's promised
new world where life will never end. A few hours here would nowhere
compare to everlasting life." His wife stated, "He told me he did not want
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If, indeed, it was universally accepted that continued life was
preferable to non-life in all situations, then one would expect that
juries would refuse to award compensatory damages in cases involving
unauthorized extensions of life." s However, it seems plausible to
believe that the courts are refusing to allow juries to award damages in
such cases precisely because juries would in fact award them.
In Allore v. Flower Hospital,' an Ohio appellate court considered a

complaint in which "appellant asked for damages for unwanted medical
care, unnecessary medical bills, the unnecessary conscious pain and
suffering of the decedent, and the mental anguish and severe emotional
distress suffered by [decedent] prior to his death." ° The court held that
"[tihese damages all relate to the damages incurred due to the
prolongation of [decedent's] life and are not recoverable," 27' suggesting
that the appellant would be limited to "damages arising from the act of
intubation/ventilation itself [or] for nominal damages for the battery.""27
The Allore court suggested that the appellant sought "damages for the
blood-he did not care if he had to die."
Id.
266. See Randolph v. City of New York, 501 N.Y.S.2d 837, 838-39 (App. Div.
1986); see also In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Mass. 1991) ("Michael and Zelia
McCauley are Jehovah's Witnesses.... A principal tenet of their religion is a belief,
based on interpretations of the Bible, that the act of receiving blood or blood products
precludes an individual from resurrection and everlasting life after death.").
Consideration of beliefs about what might happen in the hereafter might be confusing for
additional reasons. For example, should there be offsets for allowing one to get one's
eternal rewards earlier or, perhaps, for allowing one to avoid one's eternal punishment
until later? See Strasser, Wrongful Life, supra note 174, at 67.
267. But see Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 354 (Nev. 1995) (Shearing, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the value of an impaired life
does not always exceed the value of non-life).
268. But see Melvin I. Urofsky, Leaving the Door Ajar: The Supreme Court and
Assisted Suicide, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 313, 320 (1998), which states:
In Michigan, a jury awarded Brenda Young and her family $16.5 million in a
suit against Genesys St. Joseph Hospital for ignoring Ms. Young's directions
that she not be put on a ventilator. After she suffered another in a series of

seizures, the hospital and attending doctors put her on life-support, saving her
life, but also leaving her in the kind of existence she had feared and had
wanted to avoid. Ms. Young now needs round-the-clock attendance, is
mentally incompetent, has little control over her bodily functions, and must be
tied to the bed to prevent her from hurting herself.

Id. (citations omitted).
269.
270.

699 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 565.

271. Id. (citing Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225,
228-29 (Ohio 1996)).
272. Id.
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prolongation of life, a cause of action that does not exist in Ohio."273 The
court held that recovery would be "limited to those damages resulting
from the alleged battery."27 4 Yet, as was true in Anderson, unnecessary
medical costs, pain, and other losses would all seem directly caused by
the unwanted medical care, even if one brackets or disallows the claim
that the prolonged living itself is an additional imposed cost.
G. Emotional Distress
Some courts have been more willing than the Anderson and Allore
courts to entertain intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in
the context of unauthorized, life-extending treatment. The patient who
was treated against her will might bring such claims, as might her
family.27 5 For example, in Gragg v. Calandra,276 the patient had
"sustained irreversible brain damage, remained nonresponsive, and
could not survive without life support. 277 He had written a living will
indicating that in such circumstances extraordinary treatment should be
withheld." 8 Requests by the patient's family and regular physician to
discontinue life support notwithstanding, the defendant doctors
7
continued to administer that support."
The patient died a little over a
week after first going to the hospital. 0
The Gragg court made clear that operating on a patient without his
consent and maintaining that patient on life support contrary to his and
his family's express wishes are "the essence of the claim for battery"'"
and that a "defendant may be liable not only for contacts that do actual
physical harm, but also for those relatively trivial ones that are merely
offensive and insulting." 2 The court suggested that the defendants had
engaged in conduct that a jury might find sufficiently outrageous to
merit an award for intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 3 Not
only had the doctors refused to honor the living will and the patient's

273. Id. at 563.
274. Id.
275. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, § 17.5, at 363 ("[I]ntentional infliction of
emotional distress may provide a form of recovery for damages for harm to third parties
as well as to the patient.").
276. 696 N.E.2d 1282 (I. App. Ct. 1998).

277. Id. at 1285.
278. See id.
279.
280.

See id.
The patient entered the hospital on December 28, 1992, and died on January 5,

1993. See id. at 1284-85.
281. Id. at 1287.
282. Id. at 1286 (citing Cohen v. Smith, 648 N.E.2d 329, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)).
283. See id. at 1290 ("We agree with plaintiff that this conduct could be deemed
outrageous by ajury.").
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family's request for treatment to be discontinued, but they had
repeatedly and publicly accused the plaintiff and her mother of trying to
kill the patient by seeking to have treatment withdrawn."4 The court
rejected the defendants' defense that they were trying to save the
patient's life, suggesting that "[a]lthough a defendant may reasonably
believe that his objective is legitimate, it does not provide him with carte
blanche to pursue that objective by outrageous means."' ' 5
The Gragg holding should not be understood to mean that whenever
an individual claims to have been very upset by a doctor's failure to
withdraw treatment, that individual will have an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In an unpublished California case, the

wife of an incompetent had sought not to have "heroic" medical
measures taken to extend the life of her husband.26 The doctors ignored
her request.m The wife did not seek to have the feeding tube removed
and was held as a matter of law not to have suffered sufficiently to bring
the action.28 Nonetheless, the intentional infliction of emotional distress
is a cause of action that, at least potentially, can offer compensation to
284.

See id. at 1289. According to the court,
Plaintiff alleged that defendants "verbally abused" and "repeatedly
insult[ed] and injure[d]" and "willfully and wantonly inflict[ed]" severe
emotional distress on her and her mother by repeatedly accusing them in a
public area in the presence of others of trying to kill [decedent]; by continuing
life support without good cause, knowing that plaintiff and her mother were
under emotional distress; by refusing to honor [decedent's] living will and
family requests, knowing that their refusals were themselves causing plaintiff
and her mother great emotional distress; and by refusing to perform an EEG
test or to report the results of such a test, knowing that the test would likely
confirm that there was no brain activity.
Id. (first three alterations in original). Additionally, Meisel stated that
there need not be proof of actual intent-that it was the physician's purpose to
cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. Intent may be established by
showing that the defendant knew that the administration of treatment without
authorization was substantially certain to cause serious emotional distress to
the third party (constructive intent), or the defendant acted in reckless

disregardof causing serious emotional distress to that person.
2 MEISEL, supra note 26, at 374-75.
285. Gragg, 696 N.E.2d at 1290 (citing McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 810
(111.1989)) (emphasis omitted).
286.

See Westhart v. Mule, 261 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640-41 (Ct. App. 1989) (not

officially published).
287. See id. at 642.

288. See id. at 645 ("[Defendant's] failure to take action to effect removal of the
feeding tube, either directly or via court intervention, essentially forecloses her claim she
suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the doctors' extreme and outrageous
conduct.").
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victims of intentional, nonconsensual invasions and to the families
trying to prevent such invasions.
IV. CONCLUSION

No court has yet expressly recognized a cause of action for wrongful
living.289 In many cases, however, the remedies already recognized in
the law could afford the victim the same damages that a wrongful living
action would include. Certainly, as Justice Stevens made clear in his
Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health' ° dissent, "the right
to be free from unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment ....[is not]
reducible to a protection against batteries undertaken in the name of
treatment, or to a guarantee against the infliction of bodily
discomfort., 29' Nonetheless, it adds insult to injury when the penalties
currently permitted by law tend not to be imposed in wrongful living
cases. It is simply a myth to claim that a battery action will provide
sufficient disincentive 2 to deter unwanted treatment,293 given the way
the case law has been interpreted in this context.
In Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, Inc.,2 the Ohio
Supreme Court denied that its holding would mean that doctors would
have no disincentive to perform procedures which were contrary to the
will of the patient. The court explained,
Where a patient clearly delimits the medical measures he or she is willing to
undergo, and a health care provider disregards such instructions, the
consequences for that breach would include the damages arising from any
battery inflicted on the patient,
as well as appropriate licensing sanctions against
295
the medical professionals.

Yet, one wonders whether these disincentives would be adequate,
289. See Donohue, supra note 167, at 417 ("To date, no court in any American
jurisdiction has recognized a claim for wrongful living: a suit that asserts a patient's life
was wrongfully prolonged as a result of unwanted medical treatment.").
290. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).

291.

Id. at 343 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

292. See Milani, supra note 187, at 216 (suggesting that battery actions already
provide an adequate remedy); Rodriguez, supra note 2, at 12 ("Battery is the most
straightforward and clearly applicable theory for recovery of money damages for the
provision of unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment."); see also Mark Garwin,
Commentary, The Duty to Care-The Right to Refuse, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 99, 99 (1998)
("[T]he common-law courts for some time have recognized a cause of action in battery
against physicians who provide medical treatment without the consent of the patient.").
293. See Urofsky, supra note 268, at 320 (noting a spokesperson for the American
Hospital Association suggested after a 16.5 million dollar verdict that it would take
awhile for medical personnel to learn not to treat individuals whose lives are imperiled,
even when those individuals have expressed their desire not to receive treatment).
294. 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
295. Id. at 229.
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especially considering that Justice Douglas in concurrence suggested
that in his view "there could be no resulting damage for seeing to it that
a life was preserved."296 Further, if indeed the medical board shared
Justice Douglas's view that nothing wrong had been done,29 7 then it
would seem quite unlikely that any sanctions would be imposed.
Other ways to deter unwanted treatment have been discussed. Some
suggest, for example, making the perpetrator criminally liable, although

that approach seems less preferable.298 Unless some sort of sanction is at

least potentially imposed,' however, it seems reasonable to believe that
medical personnel will continue to act in the way that they believe best
promotes the patient's interests,3° express directions to the contrary

notwithstanding.
Punitive damages are imposed in cases involving trespass to property

and they seem quite appropriate in the context under discussion here."'
296.

Id. at 230 (Douglas, J., concurring).

concurring) (rejecting that anyone had engaged in
297. See id. (Douglas, J.,
"tortious conduct").
298. See Robb, supra note 261, at 175. Robb declared:
Criminal sanctions merely provide a deterrent for health care providers in
future situations. They do not provide a mechanism to enforce a patient's
wishes or a means for the patient to pay for unwanted medical treatment.
Further, criminal sanctions may be strongly against public policy because they
are contrary to the public's desire to encourage physicians to help people.
Id.
299. See Hackleman, supra note 185, at 1371-72.
[T]he wrongful living cause of action serves the policy goal of deterring
socially harmful conduct. If an individual is not allowed to recover for
wrongful living, then the physician will never be required to 'pay' for his
negligent acts. However, if a wrongful living cause of action is allowed, then
the goal of deterrence will be met by forcing the physician fully to compensate
the individual. The need to deter physicians and health care facilities from
breaching the individual's right to refuse treatment should not be
overlooked ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
300. Hackleman further stated:
Evidence suggests that physicians still consider it their responsibility to
make treatment decisions in the best interest of the patient and believe that
patient preferences should be ignored if they are inconsistent with the
physician's view of the best interest of the patient. Thus, physicians often
override patients' choices when they believe that respecting patients'
preferences would not be in the patients' best interests.
Id. at 1357-58 (citation omitted).
301. See Pedrick, supra note 261, at 82. Pedrick stated:
The physician who continues to treat the patient and who disregards the
patient's instructions forbidding use of life-sustaining procedures is chargeable
with a conscious, knowing disregard of the patient's legal right. Such knowing
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When the defendants are rarely if ever prosecuted for their wrongful
behavior, the imposition of punitive damages may be the only form of
effective deterrent 0 2 Indeed, unless punitive damages are awarded in
these kinds of cases, victims may be limited to nominal damages for the
nonconsensual bodily invasions to which they have been subjected. 3
This would mean that for all practical purposes, refusal of life-extending
treatment jurisprudence would involve a right without a remedy."°
A cause of action for wrongful living may be important to recognize
for cases involving the negligent provision of medical treatment. 0 5
Otherwise, a patient might be forced to incur great emotional and
financial costs through the negligence of medical personnel, and it is not
at all clear that the innocent patient and his family should be forced to
bear those burdens. Of course, it may be that existing medical
negligence jurisprudence already allows victims to be compensated for
these sorts of damages. In that event, wrongful living would be
important to recognize, not as a separate cause of action or even as a
damages concept, but only as establishing that, for some individuals
under some circumstances, an extension of life causes foreseeable and
easily avoidable harms, the cost of which the victim should not be forced
to bear.

Recognizing that imposing life-extending treatment against the will of
the patient can cause a harm only reinforces the established
jurisprudence in torts. Such a recognition would, at least potentially,
lend great support to the rights of autonomy and bodily integrity, and to
the principle that wrongdoers should bear the costs of the harms that
they cause. The courts should welcome rather than shun the opportunity
to support these rights and that principle when they can do so by simply
following and applying the existing jurisprudence.
It may be that the courts are reluctant to recognize a wrongful living
disregard of the patient's legal right, whether for good motives or ill, cannot be
tolerated. Punitive damages are appropriate in these cases, regardless of the
health-care giver's motive in disregarding the patient's instructions.
Id.
302. See Gregory A. Williams, Note, Tutfle v. Raymond: An Excessive Restriction
upon Punitive Damages Awards in Motor Vehicle Tort Cases Involving Reckless
Conduct, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 557 (1987).
303. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio
1996) ("[T]he plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages only.").
304. See Pollack et al., supra note 202, at 624 ("The [Anderson] court recognized a
right, but failed to provide a remedy."); Rodriguez, supra note 2, at 50 ("[lt makes little
sense to have a common-law and constitutional right to refuse treatment which, if
violated, affords no real redress, no damages.").
305. A new cause of action would be necessary if that would be the only way that
unwanted, life-extending care administered because of someone's negligence would be
held to involve harm when, for example, that treatment resulted in great pain or expense.
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claim because they believe that recognition of such a claim would
somehow imply that the life of a disabled person is without value."'
Yet, that is not what is being claimed. Rather, it is that an individual's
informed, voluntary decision to refuse treatment should be honored7 If
indeed the wrong message is being sent by imposing liability for a
tortfeasor's intentional or negligent violation of the right to bodily
autonomy when that action results in possibly long-term unnecessary
pain, then it is difficult to imagine what the right message is, and
frightening to contemplate what the tort system would become when it
has been "suitably" corrected.

306. See Milani, supra note 187, at 219 ("Judicial approval of a wrongful living
tort, in which a court would declare a person to be better off dead than disabled, would
mark a step back from this recognition that persons with disabilities can be valuable and
productive members of society.").
307. See Malloy, supra note 168, at 1042 ("By failing to impose liability when a
patient has decided to refuse treatment, the courts ignore a patient's autonomy interests
and impose their own moral judgment on the situation, determining paternalistically that
the choice to forgo treatment was incorrect or at least unworthy of respect by the legal
system.").
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